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Chapter 8
A Game-Theoretic Approach to Pairwise
Clustering and Matching
Marcello Pelillo, Samuel Rota Bulò, Andrea Torsello, Andrea Albarelli,
and Emanuele Rodolà
Abstract Clustering refers to the process of extracting maximally coherent groups
from a set of objects using pairwise, or high-order, similarities. Traditional ap-
proaches to this problem are based on the idea of partitioning the input data into
a predetermined number of classes, thereby obtaining the clusters as a by-product
of the partitioning process. In this chapter, we provide a brief review of our recent
work which offers a radically different view of the problem and allows one to work
directly on non-(geo)metric data. In contrast to the classical approach, in fact, we
attempt to provide a meaningful formalization of the very notion of a cluster in
the presence of non-metric (even asymmetric and/or negative) (dis)similarities and
show that game theory offers an attractive and unexplored perspective that serves
well our purpose. To this end, we formulate the clustering problem in terms of a
non-cooperative “clustering game” and show that a natural notion of a cluster turns
out to be equivalent to a classical (evolutionary) game-theoretic equilibrium con-
cept. Besides the game-theoretic perspective, we exhibit also characterizations of
our cluster notion in terms of optimization theory and graph theory. As for the algo-
rithmic issues, we describe two approaches to find equilibria of a clustering game.
The first one is based on the classical replicator dynamics from evolutionary game
theory, the second one is a novel class of dynamics inspired by infection and immu-
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nization processes which overcome their limitations. Finally, we show applications
of the proposed framework to matching problems, where we aim at finding cor-
respondences within a set of elements. In particular, we address the problems of
point-pattern matching and surface registration.
8.1 Introduction
Clustering is the problem of organizing a set of data elements into groups in a way
that each group satisfies an internal coherency and external incoherency property.
Researchers have focused their attention on this problem for many decades due to
its broad applicability, and recently a new wave of excitement has spread across
the machine learning community mainly because of the important development of
spectral methods. At the same time, there is also growing interest around funda-
mental questions pertaining to the very nature of the clustering problem (see, e.g.,
[1, 31, 60]). Yet, despite the tremendous progress in the field, the clustering problem
remains elusive and a satisfactory answer even to the most basic questions is still to
come.
The vast majority of the existing approaches deal with a very specific version of
the problem, which asks for partitioning the input data into coherent classes. Even
the classical distinction between hierarchical and partitional algorithms [28] seems
to suggest the idea that partitioning data is, in essence, what clustering is all about
(as hierarchies are but nested partitions). The partitional paradigm is attractive as it
leads to elegant mathematical and algorithmic treatments and allows us to employ
powerful ideas from such sophisticated fields as linear algebra, graph theory, opti-
mization, statistics, information theory, etc. However, there are several (far too often
neglected) reasons for feeling uncomfortable with this oversimplified formulation.
Probably the best-known limitation of the partitional approach is the typical (algo-
rithmic) requirement that the number of clusters be known in advance, but there is
more than that.
To begin, the very idea of a partition implies that all the input data will have to get
assigned to some class. There are various applications for which it makes little sense
to force all data items to belong to some group, a process which might result either in
poorly-coherent clusters or in the creation of extra spurious classes. As an extreme
example, consider the classical figure/ground separation problem in computer vision
which asks for extracting a coherent region (the figure) from a noisy background
[24, 49]. More recently, motivated by practical applications arising in document
retrieval and bioinformatics, a conceptually identical problem has attracted some
attention within the machine learning community and is generally known under the
name of one-class clustering [16, 23].
The second intrinsic limitation of the partitional paradigm is even more severe
as it imposes that each element cannot belong to more than one cluster. There are
a variety of important applications, however, where this requirement is too restric-
tive. Examples abound and include, e.g., clustering micro-array gene expression
8 A Game-Theoretic Approach to Pairwise Clustering and Matching 181
data (wherein a gene often participate in more than one process), clustering docu-
ments into topic categories, perceptual grouping, and segmentation of images with
transparent surfaces. Typically, this is solved by relaxing the constraints imposed by
crisp partitions in such a way as to have “soft” boundaries between clusters.
Finally, stemming from a natural assumption for central clustering frameworks,
clustering approaches have traditionally worked under the assumption that the sim-
ilarities satisfy metric properties, i.e., they are symmetric, non-negative, and satisfy
the triangle inequality. However, recently there has been a strong interest in relaxing
these requirements [27, 46, 59]. This is due to the fact that in many applications non-
metric similarities arise naturally [25, 58]. More fundamentally, some researches
argue that human perception does not satisfy metric properties [27]. While the lit-
erature presents many approaches that lift the assumption of non-negativity and tri-
angle inequality [27, 46], little progress has been made in relaxing the symmetry
constraint. Note, however, that the limited progress in grouping with asymmetric
affinities is not due to the lack of interest. In fact, there are many practical applica-
tions where asymmetric (or, more generally, non-metric) similarities do arise quite
naturally. For example, such (dis)similarity measures are typically derived when im-
ages, shapes or sequences are aligned in a template matching process. In image and
video processing, these measures are preferred in the presence of partially occluded
objects [27]. Other examples include pairwise structural alignments of proteins that
focus on local similarity [5], variants of the Hausdorff distance [18], normalized
edit-distances, and probabilistic measures such as the Kullback–Leibler divergence.
A common method to deal with asymmetric affinities is simply to symmetrize them,
but in so doing we might lose important information that reside in the asymmetry
(see, e.g., [12]). As argued in [27], the violation of metricity is often not an ar-
tifact of poor choice of features or algorithms, but it is inherent in the problem of
robust matching when different parts of objects (shapes) are matched to different im-
ages (compare this with the analysis presented in Chap. 2 concerning non-Euclidean
data). The same argument may hold for any type of local alignments. Corrections or
simplifications of the original affinity matrix of the type described in the previous
chapters may therefore destroy essential information, and is therefore important to
devise algorithms which are able to work directly on the original data.
Although probabilistic model-based approaches do not suffer from several of the
limitations mentioned above, here we suggest an alternative strategy. Instead of in-
sisting on the idea of determining a partition of the input data, and hence obtaining
the clusters as a by-product of the partitioning process, we propose to reverse the
terms of the problem and attempt instead to derive a rigorous formulation of the
very notion of a cluster. We found that game theory offers a very elegant and gen-
eral perspective that serves well our purposes. Hence, in this chapter we describe a
game-theoretic framework for clustering [38, 43, 52] which has found applications
in fields as diverse as computer vision and bioinformatics. The starting point is the
elementary observation that a “cluster” may be informally defined as a maximally
coherent set of data items, i.e., as a subset of the input data C which satisfies both
an internal criterion (all elements belonging to C should be highly similar to each
other) and an external one (no larger cluster should contain C as a proper subset).
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We then formulate the clustering problem as a non-cooperative clustering game,
where the notion of a cluster turns out to be equivalent to a classical equilibrium
concept from (evolutionary) game theory, as the latter reflects both the internal and
external cluster conditions mentioned above. The clustering game is defined as fol-
lows: Assume a pre-existing set of objects O and a (possibly asymmetric and even
negative) matrix of affinities A between the elements of O . Two players with com-
plete knowledge of the setup play by simultaneously selecting an element of O .
After both have shown their choice, each player receives a payoff, monetary or oth-
erwise, proportional to the affinity that the chosen element has with respect to the
element chosen by the opponent. Clearly, it is in each player’s interest to pick an ele-
ment that is strongly supported by the elements that the adversary is likely to choose.
As an example, let us assume that our clustering problem is one of figure/ground
discrimination, that is, the objects in O consist of a cohesive group with high mu-
tual affinity (figure) and of non-structured noise (ground). Being non-structured, the
noise gives equal average affinity to elements of the figures as to elements of the
ground. Informally, assuming no prior knowledge of the inclination of the adver-
sary, a player will be better-off selecting elements of the figure rather than of the
ground.
Within this framework, clusters correspond to the ESSs of our non-cooperative
game. The hypotheses that each object belongs to a cluster compete with one-
another, each obtaining support from compatible edges and competitive pressure
from the others. Competition will reduce the population of individuals that as-
sume weakly supported hypotheses, while allowing populations assuming hypothe-
ses with strong support to thrive. Eventually, all inconsistent hypotheses will be
driven to extinction, while all the surviving ones will reach an equilibrium whereby
they will all receive the same average support, hence exhibiting the internal co-
herency characterizing a cluster. As for the extinct hypotheses, they will provably
have a lower support, thereby hinting to external incoherency. The stable strategies
can be found using replicator dynamics, a classic formalization of a natural selection
process [26, 57], or more powerful algorithms.
Our game-theoretic formulation of the clustering problem overcomes the afore-
mentioned limitations of the majority of the clustering approaches in the literature.
Indeed, it makes no assumption on the underlying (individual) data representation:
like graph-based clustering, it does not require that the elements to be clustered be
represented as points in a vector space; it makes no assumption on the structure of
the affinity matrix, being able to work with asymmetric and even negative similarity
functions alike; it does not require a priori knowledge on the number of clusters
(since it extracts them sequentially); it leaves clutter elements unassigned; it allows
extracting overlapping clusters [53]; it generalizes naturally to hypergraph cluster-
ing problems, i.e., in the presence of high-order affinities [44], in which case the
clustering game is played by more than two players.
Outline The chapter is organized as follows. We provide basic game-theoretic
notions and notation in Sect. 8.2. Section 8.3 presents the idea of the clustering game
and provides different characterizations thereof. In Sect. 8.4, we describe algorithms
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that can be used to find clusters according to the proposed framework. In Sects. 8.5
and 8.6, we present two effective applications of our clustering framework to the
problem of matching, which is central to any recognition task where the object to
be recognized is naturally divided into several parts, and the problem of surface
alignment, which is a fundamental step in the reconstruction of three-dimensional
objects.
8.2 Notations and Theoretical Background
According to classical game theory [21], a game of strategy between two players can
be formalized as a triplet Γ = (P,S,π), where P = {1,2} is the set of two “players”
(or agents), S = {1, . . . , n} is a set of pure strategies (or actions) available to each
player, and π : S2 →R is a payoff function, which assigns a utility to each strategy
profile (s1, s2) ∈ S2, which is an (ordered) pair of pure strategies played by the
different players.1 The payoff function can also be represented as a 2-dimensional
matrix A = (aij ) ∈Rn×n such that aij = π(i, j).
Evolutionary game theory originated in the early 1970s as an attempt to apply
the principles and tools of game theory to biological contexts, with a view to model
the evolution of animal, as opposed to human, behavior (see the classical work by
J. Maynard Smith [35] who pioneered the field). It considers an idealized scenario
whereby individuals are repeatedly drawn at random from a large, ideally infinite,
population to play a two-player game. In contrast to classical game theory, here
players are not supposed to behave rationally or to have complete knowledge of the
details of the game. They act instead according to an inherited behavioral pattern, or
pure strategy, and it is supposed that some evolutionary selection process operates
over time on the distribution of behaviors. Here, and in the sequel, an agent with
preassigned strategy j ∈ S will be called a j -strategist. The state of the population
at a given time t can be represented as an n-dimensional vector x(t), where xj (t)
represents the fraction of j -strategists in the population at time t . Hence, the initial
distribution of preassigned strategies in the population is given by x(0). The set of
all possible states describing a population is given by
Δ =
{
x ∈Rn :
∑
j∈S
xj = 1 and xj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ S
}
which is called the standard simplex. Points in the standard simplex are also referred
to as mixed strategies in game theory. As time passes, the distribution of strategies in
the population changes under the effect of a selection mechanism which, by analogy
with Darwinian process, aims at spreading the fittest strategies in the population
1We note that although we restrict ourselves to games where all players share the same set of pure
strategies and payoff function, in more general settings each agent can well be associated to its
own pure strategy set and payoff function.
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to the detriment of the weakest ones which, in turn, will be driven to extinction
(we postpone the formalization of one such selection mechanism to Sect. 8.4). For
notational convenience, we drop the time reference t from a population state and we
refer to x ∈ Δ as a population rather than population state. Moreover, we denote by
σ(x) the support of x ∈ Δ:
σ(x) = {j ∈ S : xj > 0}
which is the set of strategies that are alive in a given population x.
We will find it useful to define the following function u :Rn ×Rn →R:
u
(
y(1),y(2)
) = ∑
(s1,s2)∈S2
π(s1, s2)
∏
i∈{1,2}
y(i)si = y(1)

Ay(2). (8.1)
We will also write ej to indicate the n-vector with xj = 1 and zero elsewhere. Now,
it is easy to see that the expected payoff earned by a j -strategist in a population
x ∈ Δ is given by
u
(
ej ,x
) = (Ax)j = ∑
s∈S
ajs, xs,
while the expected payoff over the entire population is given by
u(x,x) = xAx =
∑
j∈S
xj (Ax)j .
Given a population x, we denote by τ−(x) the set of pure strategies that perform
worse than average, i.e.,
τ−(x) =
{
j ∈ S : u(ej ,x) < u(x,x)},
by τ+(x) the set of strategies performing better than the average, i.e.,
τ+(x) =
{
j ∈ S : u(ej ,x) > u(x,x)},
and finally by τ0(x) the set of strategies performing as the average, i.e.,
τ0(x) =
{
j ∈ S : u(ej ,x) = u(x,x)}.
A fundamental notion in game theory is that of an equilibrium [57]. Intuitively,
an evolutionary process reaches an equilibrium x ∈ Δ when every individual in the
population obtains the same expected payoff and no strategy can thus prevail upon
the other ones. Formally, x ∈ Δ is a Nash equilibrium if
u
(
ej ,x
) ≤ u(x,x), for all j ∈ S. (8.2)
In other words, at a Nash equilibrium every agent in the population performs at most
as well as the overall population expected payoff. This can also be compactly written
8 A Game-Theoretic Approach to Pairwise Clustering and Matching 185
as τ+(x) ∩ S = ∅. A Nash equilibrium x ∈ Δ can be equivalently characterized by
the condition that
u(y,x) ≤ u(x,x) (8.3)
for all y ∈ Δ. We say that a Nash equilibrium x is strict if (8.3) holds with strict
inequality for all y ∈ Δ \ {x}.
Within a population-based setting, the notion of a Nash equilibrium turns out to
be too weak as it lacks stability under small perturbations. This motivated J. May-
nard Smith, in his seminal work [35], to introduce a refinement of the Nash equilib-
rium concept generally known as an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS). Formally,
assume that in a population x ∈ Δ, a small share ε of mutant agents appear, whose
distribution of strategies is y ∈ Δ. The resulting post-entry population is then given
by wε = (1 − ε)x + εy. Biological intuition suggests that evolutionary forces select
against mutant individuals if and only if the expected payoff of a mutant agent in the
postentry population is lower than that of an individual from the original population,
i.e.,
u(y,wε) < u(x,wε). (8.4)
Hence, a population x ∈ Δ is said to be evolutionary stable if inequality (8.4) holds
for any distribution of mutant agents y ∈ Δ \ {x}, granted the population share of
mutants ε is sufficiently small. It can be shown [57] that x is an ESS equilibrium if
and only if it is a Nash equilibrium and the additional stability property u(x,y) >
u(y,y) holds for all y ∈ Δ \ {x} such that u(y,x) = u(x,x).
8.3 Clustering Games
An instance of the clustering problem can be described by an edge-weighted graph,
which is formally defined as a triplet G = (V ,E,ω), where V = {1, . . . , n} is a
finite set of vertices, E ⊆ V × V is the set of oriented edges and ω : E → R is
a real-valued function which assigns a weight to each edge. Within our clustering
framework, the vertices in G correspond to the objects to be clustered, the edges
represent neighborhood relationships among objects, and the edge-weights reflect
similarity among linked objects. Note that in our framework no assumption is made
on the similarity function.
Given a graph G = (V ,E,ω), representing an instance of a clustering problem,
we cast it into a two-player clustering game Γ = (P,V,π) where the players’ pure
strategies correspond to the objects to be clustered and the payoff function π is
proportional to the similarity of the objects/strategies (v1, v2) ∈ V 2 selected by the
players:
π(v1, v2) =
{
ω(v1, v2) if (v1, v2) ∈ E,
0 otherwise.
(8.5)
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Our clustering game will be played within an evolutionary setting wherein the
two players, each of which is assumed to play a pre-assigned strategy, are repeat-
edly drawn at random from a large population. Here, given a population x ∈ Δ,
xj (j ∈ V ) represents the fraction of players that is programmed to select j from
the objects to be clustered. A dynamic evolutionary selection process, as the one
described in Sect. 8.4, will then make the population x evolve according to a Dar-
winian survival-of-the-fittest principle in such a way that, eventually, the better-
than-average objects will survive and the others will get extinct. It is clear that the
whole dynamical process is driven by the payoff function π which, in our case, has
been defined in (8.5) precisely to favor the evolution of highly coherent objects. Ac-
cordingly, the support σ(x) of the converged population x does represent a cluster,
the non-null components of x providing a measure of the degree of membership of
its elements. Indeed, the expected population payoff u(x,x) can be regarded as a
measure of the cluster’s internal coherency in terms of the average similarity of the
objects forming the cluster, whereas the expected payoff u(ej ,x) of a player select-
ing object j ∈ V in x measures the average similarity of object j with respect to the
cluster.
We claim that, within this setting, the clusters of a clustering problem instance
can be characterized in terms of the ESSs of the corresponding (evolutionary) clus-
tering game, thereby justifying the following definition.
Definition 8.1 (ESS-cluster) Given an instance of a clustering problem G =
(V ,E,ω), an ESS-cluster of G is an ESS of the corresponding clustering game.
For the sake of simplicity, when it will be clear from context, the term ESS-
cluster will be used henceforth to refer to either the ESS itself, namely the member-
ship vector x ∈ Δ, or to its support σ(x) = C ⊆ V .
The motivation behind the above definition resides in the observation that ESS-
clusters do incorporate the two basic properties of a cluster, i.e.,
• Internal coherency: elements belonging to the cluster should have high mutual
similarities;
• External incoherency: the overall cluster internal coherency decreases by intro-
ducing external elements.
The rest of this section is devoted to provide support to this claim.
8.3.1 A Combinatorial Characterization
In this section, we provide a complete combinatorial characterization of the clus-
ters under our game-theoretic framework, or more generally of evolutionary stable
strategies of two-person symmetric games, which we derived from the dominant set
framework [38].
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Let S = {1, . . . } be the set of the objects to be clustered, let A be the objects’
similarity matrix and let C ⊆ S be a non-empty subset of objects. The (average)
weighted in-degree of i ∈ S with respect to C is defined as:
awindegC(i) =
1
|C|
∑
j∈C
aij ,
where |C| denotes the cardinality of C. Moreover, if j ∈ C we define
φC(i, j) = aij − awindegC(j),
which is a measure of the similarity of object i with object j with respect to the
average similarity of object j with elements in C. The weight of i with respect to C
is
WC(i) =
{
1 if |C| = 1,∑
j∈C\{i} φC\{i}(i, j)WC\{i}(j) otherwise,
while the total weight of C is defined as
W(C) =
∑
i∈C
WC(i).
Intuitively, WC(i) gives us a measure of the support that object i receives from the
objects in C \ {i} relative to the overall mutual similarity of the objects in C \ {i}.
Here positive values indicate that i has high similarity to C \ {i}.
A non-empty subset of objects C ⊆ S such that W(T ) > 0 for any non-empty
T ⊆ C is said to be a dominant set if:
1. WC(i) > 0, for all i ∈ C,
2. WC∪{i}(i) ≤ 0, for all i /∈ C.
The two previous conditions correspond to the two main properties of a cluster:
the first regards internal homogeneity, whereas the second regards external hetero-
geneity. The above definition represents our formalization of the concept of a cluster,
when A is the similarity matrix describing the clustering problem.
The weighted characteristic vector xC of a set C ⊆ S is defined as
xCi =
{
WC(i)
W(C)
if i ∈ C,
0 otherwise.
Theorem 8.1 If C ⊆ S is a dominant set with respect to affinity matrix A, then xC
is an ESS for a two-player game with payoff matrix A.
Conversely, if x is an ESS for a two-person game with payoff matrix A, then
C = σ(x) is a dominant set with respect to A, provided that C = τ0(x).
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Proof See [52]. 
This result provides a generalization of the dominant set framework [38] to asym-
metric affinities.
8.3.2 A Link to Optimization Theory
If we restrict our attention to symmetric payoff functions, then the notions of Nash
equilibrium and ESS have a natural interpretation in terms of optimization theory.
Let A be a symmetric payoff matrix and consider the following constrained pro-
gram, also known as standard quadratic program [9]:
maximize u(x,x) = xT Ax
subject to x ∈ Δ ⊂Rn.
(8.6)
A point x satisfies the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions for problem (8.6),
i.e., the first-order necessary conditions for local optimality [34], if there exists n+1
real constants (Lagrange multipliers) μ1, . . . ,μn and λ, with μi ≥ 0 for all i =
1, . . . , n, such that
(Ax)i − λ + μi = 0,
and
∑n
i=1 xiμi = 0. Note that, since both xi and μi are nonnegative for all i =
1, . . . , n, the latter condition is equivalent to saying that i ∈ σ(x) implies μi = 0.
Hence, the KKT conditions can be rewritten as
u
(
ei ,x
) = (Ax)i
{= λ if i ∈ σ(x),
≤ λ otherwise,
for some real constant λ.
It is immediate to see that λ = u(x,x). In fact,
u(x,x) =
∑
i∈σ(x)
xiu
(
ei ,x
) = ∑
i∈σ(x)
xiλ = λ.
Therefore, we have that x satisfies the KKT condition if for all i = 1, . . . , n,
u(ei ,x) ≤ u(x,x), which indeed corresponds to the Nash equilibrium condition.
Hence, under symmetric payoff matrices, the Nash condition is equivalent to the
necessary condition for local optimality in (8.6). Moreover, as shown in the follow-
ing theorem, ESS equilibria can be characterized in terms of strict local solutions
of (8.6).
Theorem 8.2 Strict local maximizers of (8.6) are ESS equilibria of a two-player
game with payoff matrix A and vice versa.
Proof See [26]. 
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8.3.3 A Link to Graph Theory
Let G = (V ,E) be an undirected graph without self-loops, where V = {1,2, . . . , n}
is the set of vertices and E ⊆ V ×V the set of edges. We define the order of a graph
G as the cardinality of V . Two vertices u,v ∈ V are adjacent if (u, v) ∈ E. A subset
C of vertices in G is called a clique if all its vertices are mutually adjacent. It is a
maximal clique if it is not a subset of other cliques in G. It is a maximum clique if it
has maximum cardinality. The cardinality of a maximum clique of G is also called
clique number and it is denoted by ω(G). The adjacency matrix of G is the n × n
symmetric matrix AG = (aij ), where aij = 1 if (i, j) ∈ E, aij = 0 otherwise.
The adjacency matrix of an undirected graph can be regarded to as the similarity
matrix of a clustering problem, and therefore our framework can be used to find the
clusters. Due to this link to graph theory, it is interesting to see the interpretation of
our game-theoretic notion of cluster in this context.
Consider the following constrained quadratic program:
maximize fα(x) = xT (AG + αI)x
subject to x ∈ Δ ⊂Rn,
(8.7)
where n is the order of G, I the identity matrix, α is a real parameter, and where Δ
is the standard simplex of the n-dimensional Euclidean space.
In 1965, Motzkin and Straus [36] established a connection between the maxi-
mum clique problem and the program in (8.7) with α = 0. Specifically, they related
the clique number of G to global solutions x∗ of the program through the formula
ω(G) = (1 − f0(x∗))−1, and showed that a subset of vertices C is a maximum
clique of G if and only if its characteristic vector xC ∈ Δ is a global maximizer of
f0 on Δ.2 Pelillo and Jagota [40] extended the Motzkin–Straus theorem by provid-
ing a characterization of maximal cliques in terms of local maximizers of f0 in Δ.
A drawback of the original Motzkin–Straus formulation is the existence of “spu-
rious” solutions, i.e., maximizers of f0 over Δ that are not in the form of charac-
teristic vectors. This was observed empirically by Pardalos and Phillips [37] and
formalized later by Pelillo and Jagota [40]. In principle, spurious solutions repre-
sent a problem since, while providing information about the order of the maximum
clique, they do not allow us to easily extract its vertices. Fortunately, there is a
straightforward solution to this problem which has been introduced by Bomze [8].
He, indeed, suggested to adopt the formulation in (8.7) and basically proved that for
0 < α < 1 all local maximizer of (8.7) are strict and in one-to-one correspondence
with the characteristic vectors of the maximal cliques of G.
There is an interesting relation between our notion of cluster and graph theory
that arises if we consider AG + αI as the similarity matrix. As seen in the previous
section, the first order necessary conditions for x to be a local maximizer of (8.7)
2In the original paper, Motzkin and Straus proved the “only-if” part of this theorem. The converse,
however, is a straightforward consequence of their result [40].
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coincide with the conditions for x to be a Nash equilibrium. Hence, local maximizers
of (8.7) are indeed Nash equilibria, but the converse does not necessarily hold. On
the other hand, we have that x is an ESS if and only if it is a strict local maximizer
of (8.7). Since strict local maximizer are in one-to-one correspondence with the
maximal cliques of G, we have that the support of an ESS is indeed a maximal
clique. Consequently, there exists a one-to-one relation between maximal cliques of
a graph G and ESS-clusters of a clustering game with payoff matrix AG +αI when
0 < α < 1 as stated by the following proposition.
Proposition 8.1 Let G = (V ,E) be an undirected graph with adjacency matrix AG
and 0 < α < 1. A mixed strategy x is an ESS of a symmetric two-player game with
payoff matrix AG + αI if and only if it is the characteristic vector of a maximal
clique of G.
Proof ESSs of AG +αI are in one-to-one correspondence with the strict local max-
imizers of (8.7) [26] and x is a strict local maximizer of fα(x) if and only if it is the
characteristic vector of a maximal clique of G [8]. Hence, the result follows. 
Finally, an extension of this result to the case of directed graphs can be found
in [52].
8.4 Algorithms
In the previous section, we introduced a game-theoretic notion of cluster, but we
only mentioned at the way clustering effectively takes place. Summarizing, the in-
tuition is to let non-rational individuals play the clustering game under an evolution-
ary setting, until the distribution of strategies reaches an equilibrium, which in turn
provides us with a cluster. In order this to work, however, we have to specify some
selection mechanisms that effectively drives the population to equilibrium, which,
resembling a Darwinian process, spreads the fittest strategies in the population to the
detriment of the weakest one, which in turn will be driven to extinction. The section
starts introducing the replicator dynamics, i.e., the standard dynamics developed in
evolutionary game theory. Afterwards, we present a new class of dynamics that have
several desired features and are computationally more appealing than the replicator
dynamics.
8.4.1 Replicator Dynamics
In evolutionary game theory, the assumption is made that the game is played over
and over, generation after generation, and that the action of natural selection will
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result in the evolution of the fittest strategies. A general class of evolution equations
is given by the following set of ordinary differential equations [57]:
x˙i = xi(t)gi(x) (8.8)
for i = 1, . . . , n, where a dot signifies derivative with respect to time and g =
(g1, . . . , gn) is a function with open domain containing Δ. Here, the function gi
(i ∈ S) specifies the rate at which pure strategy i replicates. It is usually required
that the growth function g is regular [57], which means that it is Lipschitz contin-
uous and that g(x)x = 0 for all x ∈ Δ. The former condition guarantees us that
the system of the differential equation (8.8) has a unique solution through any initial
population state. The latter condition, instead, ensures that the simplex Δ is invariant
under (8.8), namely, any trajectory starting in Δ will remain in Δ.
A point x is said to be a stationary (or equilibrium) point for our dynamical
systems, if x˙i = 0 (i ∈ S). A stationary point x is (Lyapunov) stable if for every
neighborhood U of x there exists a neighborhood V of x such that x(0) ∈ V implies
x(t) ∈ U for all t ≥ 0. A stationary point is said to be asymptotically stable if any
trajectory starting in its vicinity will converge to it as t → ∞.
Payoff-monotonic game dynamics represent a wide class of regular selection dy-
namics for which useful properties hold. Intuitively, for a payoff-monotonic dynam-
ics the strategies associated to higher payoffs will increase at a higher rate. Formally,
a regular selection dynamics (8.8) is said to be payoff-monotonic if
gi(x) > gj (x) ⇔ u
(
ei ,x
)
> u
(
ej ,x
)
for all x ∈ Δ and i, j ∈ S.
Although this class contains many different dynamics, it turns out that they share
a lot of common properties. To begin, they all have the same set of stationary points.
Indeed, x ∈ Δ is a stationary point under any payoff monotonic dynamics if and
only if u(ei ,x) = u(x,x) holds for all i ∈ σ(x) [57].
A well-known subclass of payoff-monotonic game dynamics is given by
x˙i = xi
(
f
(
u
(
ei ,x
)) − ∑
j∈S
xjf
(
u
(
ej ,x
)))
,
where f (u) is an increasing function of u. These models arise in modeling the
evolution of behavior by way of imitation processes, where players are occasionally
given the opportunity to change their own strategies [57].
When f is the identity function, that is, f (u) = u, we obtain the standard
continuous-time replicator equations,
x˙i = xi
(
u
(
ei ,x
) − u(x,x)), (8.9)
whose basic idea is that the average rate of increase x˙i/xi equals the difference
between the average fitness of strategy i and the mean fitness over the entire popu-
lation.
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Another popular model arises when f (u) = eku, where k is a positive constant.
As k tends to 0, the orbits of this dynamics approach those of the standard, first-order
replicator model, slowed down by the factor k; moreover, for large values of k, the
model approximates the so-called best-reply dynamics [26].
The replicator dynamics, and more in general any payoff monotonic dynamics,
have the following properties[26, 57]:
Theorem 8.3 Under any payoff monotonic dynamics the following hold true:
• A Nash equilibrium is a stationary point;
• A strict Nash equilibrium is asymptotically stable;
• A stationary point x∗ that is the limit of an interior orbit, i.e., such that σ(x(t)) =
S for all t ≥ 0 and limt→∞ x(t) = x∗, is a Nash equilibrium;
• A stable stationary point is a Nash equilibrium;
• An ESS is asymptotically stable.
In general, the converses of the implications in Theorem 8.3 do not hold.
Furthermore, if we restrict our focus to symmetric payoff matrices, i.e., A = A,
then stronger properties hold, as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 8.4 If A = A then the following hold:
• u(x,x) is strictly increasing along any non-constant trajectory of (8.9). In other
words, for all t ≥ 0 we have u˙(x,x) > 0, unless x is a stationary point. Further-
more, any such trajectory converges to a (unique) stationary point;
• x is asymptotically stable if and only if x is an ESS.
In order to implement the continuous-time replicator dynamics, one can resort
to some iterative method like, e.g., the Runge–Kutta method, to find an approxi-
mate solution to the ordinary differential equations. Alternatively, one can adopt
the discrete-time counterpart of (8.9), known as discrete-time replicator dynamics,
which (assuming non-negative payoffs) is given by
xi(t + 1) = xi(t)u(e
i ,x)
u(x,x)
,
for i ∈ S. This equation is known to possess many of the dynamical properties of
the continuous-time dynamics [57].
8.4.2 Infection and Immunization Dynamics
In order to overcome some computational problems afflicting standard evolutionary
dynamics, we introduce a new class of evolutionary dynamics, inspired by infection
and immunization processes.
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Let x ∈ Δ be the incumbent population state, y be the mutant population invading
x and let z = (1−ε)x+εy be the population state obtained by injecting into x a small
share of y-strategists. Then the score function of y versus x (introduced in [10]) is
given by
hx(y, ε) = u(y, z) − u(x, z) = εu(y − x,y − x) + u(y − x,x).
Following [11], we define the (neutral) invasion barrier bx(y) of x ∈ Δ against any
mutant strategy y as the largest population share εy of y-strategists such that for all
smaller positive population shares ε, x earns a higher or equal payoff than y in the
post-entry population z. Formally,
bx(y) = inf
{
ε ∈ (0,1) : hx(y, ε) > 0
} ∪ {1}.
Given populations x,y ∈ Δ, we say that x is immune against y if bx(y) > 0. Triv-
ially, a population is always immune against itself. Note that x is immune against y
if and only if either u(y − x,x) < 0 or u(y − x,x) = 0 and u(y − x,y − x) ≤ 0. If
u(y − x,x) > 0, we say that y is infective for x. Hence, the set of infective strategies
for x is given by
Υ (x) = {y ∈ Δ : u(y − x,x) > 0}.
Consider y ∈ Υ (x); clearly, this implies bx(y) = 0. If we allow for an invasion of
a share ε of y-strategists as long as the score function of y versus x is positive, at
the end we will have a share of δy(x) mutants in the postentry population, where
δy(x) = inf
{
ε ∈ (0,1) : hx(y, ε) ≤ 0
} ∪ {1}.
Note that if y is infective for x, then δy(x) > 0, whereas if x is immune against y,
then δy(x) = 0. Further note that all the above concepts can be straightforwardly
extended to contests with more than two participants and/or correlated individual
behavior, where the score functions may be nonlinear in ε; see, e.g., [11] and refer-
ences therein. In our two-person context, score functions are (affine-)linear, so that
there is a simpler expression for δy(x):
δy(x) =
{
min{ u(x−y,x)
u(y−x,y−x) ,1} if u(y − x,y − x) < 0,
1 otherwise.
(8.10)
It can be proven [42] that if we allow a population x to be invaded by an infective
strategy y, and the extent of this infection is δy(x), then the postentry population will
become immune against y. In formal terms, given y ∈ Υ (x) and z = [1 − δy(x)]x +
δy(x)y, we have that z is immune against y. The core idea of our method consists
in selecting a strategy y which is infective for the current population x. By allowing
for invasion as shown before, we obtain a new population z which is immune to y.
This idea suggests the following class of new dynamics which for evident reasons
is called Infection and Immunization Dynamics (InImDyn):
x(t + 1) = δS (x)(x)
[
S (x) − x] + x, (8.11)
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where x should be regarded to as x(t) and S : Δ → Δ is a strategy selection func-
tion, which returns an infective strategy for x if it exists, or x otherwise:
S (x) =
{
y for some y ∈ Υ (x) if Υ (x) = ∅,
x otherwise.
(8.12)
By reiterating this process of immunization, we aim at reaching a population state
x that cannot be infected by any other strategy. If this is the case then x is a fixed
point under dynamics (8.11), but also a Nash strategy:
Theorem 8.5 Let x ∈ Δ be a strategy. Then the following statements are equiva-
lent:
(a) Υ (x) = ∅, i.e., there is no infective strategy for x;
(b) x is a Nash strategy;
(c) x is a fixed point under dynamics (8.11).
Proof See [42]. 
The following result shows that the average payoff is strictly increasing along
any non-constant trajectory of the dynamics (8.11), provided that the payoff matrix
is symmetric.
Theorem 8.6 Let {x(t)}t≥0 be a trajectory of (8.11). Then for all t ≥ 0,
u
(
x(t + 1),x(t + 1)) ≥ u(x(t),x(t)),
with equality if and only if x(t) = x(t + 1), provided that the payoff matrix is sym-
metric.
Proof See [42]. 
Theorem 8.6 shows that by running INIMDYN, under a symmetric payoff func-
tion, we strictly increase the population payoff unless we are at a fixed point, i.e.,
have already reached Nash equilibrium. This, of course, holds for any selection
function S (x) satisfying (8.12). However, the way we choose S (x) may affect
the efficiency of the dynamics. The next section introduces a particular selection
function that leads to a well-performing dynamics for our purposes.
Depending on how we choose the function S (x) in (8.11), we may obtain differ-
ent dynamics. One in particular, which is simple and leads to nice properties, con-
sists in allowing only infective pure strategies or their respective co-strategies. This
way, our equilibrium selection process closely resembles a vertex-pivoting method,
as opposed to interior-point approaches like replicator dynamics or best-response
dynamics [26].
If x is not fixed under (8.11), i.e., is not a Nash strategy, straightforward intuition
renders selection of an infective strategy in a way easier than it could seem at first
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Fig. 8.1 Example of a
co-strategy of the pure
strategy e1 with respect to x
glance. Let x be the current population and let y be a strategy. The co-strategy of y
with respect to x is given by
yx = (1 − ε¯)x + ε¯y,
where
ε¯ = min{ε ∈R : (1 − ε)x + εy ∈ Δ} ≤ 0.
For any strategy y, if both u(y − x,x) and ε¯ are nonzero, then either y ∈ Υ (x) or
yx ∈ Υ (x) in an exclusive sense.
In Fig. 8.1, we can see that the co-strategy of ei with respect to x is the inter-
section between the simplex boundary and the half line originated in ei and passing
through x. In this case, ε¯ = xi/(xi − 1).
Consider the strategy selection function SPure(x), which finds a pure strategy i
maximizing |u(ei − x,x)|, and returns ei , eix or x according to whether i ∈ τ+(x),
i ∈ τ−(x)∩ σ(x) or i ∈ τ0(x): Let M (x) be a (randomly or otherwise selected) pure
strategy such that
M (x) ∈ arg max{u(ei − x,x) : i ∈ τ+(x)} ∪ {u(x − ei ,x) : i ∈ τ−(x) ∩ σ(x)}.
Then SPure(x) can be written as
SPure(x) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
ei if i = M (x) ∈ τ+(x),
eix if i = M (x) ∈ τ−(x) ∩ σ(x),
x otherwise.
For obvious reasons, we refer to InImDyn with selection function SPure(x) as
Pure InImDyn.
Note that the search space for an infective strategy is reduced from Δ to a finite
set. Therefore, it is not obvious that SPure(x) is a well-defined selection function,
i.e., it satisfies (8.12). However, one can prove [42] than there exists an infective
strategy for x if and only if SPure(x) is infective for x.
Another property that holds for our new dynamics, which is shared also by the
replicator dynamics, is the characterization of ESS equilibria in terms of asymptot-
ically stable points of the dynamics under symmetric payoff matrices.
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Algorithm 1: FindEquilibrium(A,x, τ )
Require: n × n payoff matrix A, x ∈ Δ and tolerance τ .
while ε(x) > τ do
y ← SPure(x)
δ ← 1
if π(y − x) < 0 then
δ ← min[π(x−y|x)
π(y−x) ,1]
end if
x ← δ(y − x) + x
end while
return x
Theorem 8.7 A state x is asymptotically stable for INIMDYN with SPure as strat-
egy selection function if and only if x is an ESS, provided that the payoff matrix is
symmetric.
Proof See [42]. 
This selection function exhibits the nice property of rendering the complexity
per iteration of our new dynamics linear in both space and time, as opposed to the
replicator dynamics, which have quadratic space/time complexity per iteration.
Theorem 8.8 Given the iterate x(t) and its linear transformations Ax(t) and
Ax(t), both space and time requirement of one iteration step is linear in n, the
number of objects.
Proof See [45]. 
The only step of quadratic complexity is the first one, where we need to compute
Ax(0) and Ax(0). Even this can be reduced to linear complexity, if we start from
a pure strategy ei , in which case we have Ax(0) = Ai and Ax(0) = (A)i . Note
that the latter is impossible, e.g., for the replicator dynamics.
The algorithmic procedure for finding an equilibrium using INIMDYN with SPure
is summarized in Algorithm 1. Note that as stopping criterion we compute the fol-
lowing quantity:
ε(x) =
∑
i
min
{
xi,π
(
x − ei |x)}2 < τ, (8.13)
which measures the degree of violation of the Nash conditions. Indeed, ε(x) = 0 if
and only if x is a Nash equilibrium.
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8.5 Game-Theoretic Matching
The problem of finding correspondences within a set of elements, or features, is cen-
tral to any recognition task where the object to be recognized is naturally divided
into several parts. In this context, graph-based representations have been used with
considerable success due to their ability to capture concisely the relational arrange-
ment of object primitives, in a manner which can be invariant to changes in object
viewpoint. However, applications in which estimating a set of correspondences is a
central task toward the solution range from object recognition, to 3D registration, to
feature tracking, to stereo reconstruction [7, 30, 33]. Several matching algorithms
have been proposed in the literature. Some can just be classified as ad hoc solutions
to specific problems, but the vast majority cast the problem into an energy minimiza-
tion framework and extract approximate optimizers of an objective function within
a set of feasible correspondences. In general, the overall goal is to maximize the
global or local coherence of the matched pairs with respect to some compatibility.
In most cases, the objective function can be written as a monotonic transformation
of the sum of pairwise interactions between matching hypotheses. This can be either
the similarity between matched features, as in the graph-matching case [4, 19, 55],
and often the set of feasible correspondences can be defined using only unary and
binary relations. For instance, it is possible to guarantee a global one-to-one match
and structural coherence using the association graph technique described by Barrow
and Burstall [6]. Also adjacency and hierarchical constraints can be enforced on a
local pairwise basis, as shown by the many techniques that cast the matching prob-
lem to an equivalent clique search in an auxiliary association graph [39, 41, 51].
Formulations that satisfy these conditions range from bipartite matching, to sub-
graph isomorphism, to quadratic assignment, to edit-distance, and include a dual
form of parameter estimation approaches such as Hough transform and RANSAC.
The previous sections introduced a novel game-theoretic clustering approach. In
this section, we will build from that framework to introduce a matching approach
based on the game-theoretic selection of correspondences between features to be
matched. The first part will be devoted to the introduction of the novel selection
process, while the second and third part will show applications of this frameworks
to two important computer vision tasks.
We present a game-theoretic approach to correspondence estimation derived
from the clustering approach presented in the previous section. The proposed ap-
proach is quite general since it can be applied to any formulation where both the
objective function and the feasible set can be defined in terms of unary and pair-
wise interactions. The main idea is to model the set of possible correspondences as
a set of game strategies. Specifically, we formulate the matching problem as a non-
cooperative game where the potential associations between the items to be matched
correspond to strategies, while payoffs reflect the degree of compatibility between
competing hypotheses. A distinguishing feature of the proposed framework is that
it allows one to naturally deal with general many-to-many matching problems even
in the presence of asymmetric compatibilities.
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8.5.1 Matching as a Non-cooperative Game
Before going into the details of the proposed framework, we need to introduce some
notations and definitions that will be used throughout. Let O1 and O2 be the two
sets of features that we want to match, we define the set of feasible associations
A ⊆ O1 × O2 the set of relations between O1 and O2 that satisfy the unary con-
straints. Hence, each feasible association represents a possible matching hypothesis.
We assume that we can compute a set of pairwise compatibilities C :A×A→R+
that measure the support that one association gives to the other. Here, the self com-
patibilities, i.e., the compatibilities that an association gives to itself, are assumed to
be zero.
In this formulation, a submatch (or simply a match) is intuitively a set of associa-
tions, which satisfies the pairwise feasibility constraints, and two additional criteria:
high internal compatibility, i.e., the associations belonging to the match are mu-
tually highly compatible, and low external compatibility, i.e., associations outside
the match are scarcely compatible with those inside. This definition of match al-
lows us to abstract from the specific problem, since domain-specific information is
confined to the definition of the compatibility function. Further, we are able to deal
with many-to-many, one-to-many, many-to-one, and one-to-one relations in a uni-
form way, as we do not impose restriction on the way the associations are selected,
but incorporate the constraints with the compatibilities.
The proposed approach generalizes the association graph technique described by
Barrow and Burstall [6] to a context where structural constraints are continuous.
Further, the approach can be seen as a proper generalization of [39] since, in case
of symmetric 0,1 supports, the solutions of the ESSs maximize the same objective
function.
We define a matching game as a clustering game over the associations. Assume
that we have two sets of objects O1 and O2, and a compatibility function C. Let
O = {1, . . . , n} be the enumeration of the set of associations A , where n = |A |.
In the matching game, the set of feasible correspondences O forms the set of pure
strategies (in the language of game-theory) available to the players and A = (aij )
is an n × n payoff (or utility) matrix [56], where cij is the payoff that a player
gains when playing the strategy i against an opponent playing strategy j . Within our
matching setting, Nash equilibria are good candidates for a match, as they satisfy
both the internal and external compatibility criteria. In fact, any association i ∈ σ(x)
of a Nash equilibrium x receives from x the same expected payoff (Ax)i = xT Ax,
while associations not in σ(x) receive a lower or equal support from associations of
the match. Note, however, that the external criterion is not strict: there could exist
associations not in σ(x) that earn a payoff equal to xT Ax like associations in the
group, which may lead to a non-isolated Nash equilibrium and, thus, to an ambigu-
ous match. Therefore, here we undertake an evolutionary game-theoretic analysis of
the possible strategies available to each player.
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8.5.1.1 Enforcing Hard Constraints
A main characteristic of the proposed approach is that associations pairs that have
zero compatibility cannot be in the same selected submatch. This means that pair-
wise constraints can be enforced by forcing to zero the compatibility between asso-
ciations that do not satisfy the constraints.
Theorem 8.9 Consider a matching-game with compatibilities A = (aij ) with
aij ≥ 0 and aii = 0. If x ∈ Δ is an ESS then aij > 0 for all i, j ∈ σ(x).
For a proof see [3].
Theorem 8.9 shows that if we set a non-positive compatibility between two as-
sociations, then there exists no match containing them. This provides a way for
expressing hard constraints in our matching framework such as one-to-one or one-
to-many correspondences.
8.5.2 Point-Pattern Matching
In this set of experiments, our goal is to test the ability of the proposed framework
to match corresponding features points between two instances of the same image
with modified scale and orientation. The feature points are extracted from each im-
age with the SIFT algorithm [33]. SIFT features are known to be highly repeatable
under a large class of affine transformations and are very resilient to splitting or
joining. Under these conditions, we need a very selective matcher which enforces a
common global transformation to all the matched features. In [33], Lowe gauges the
coherence of the transformation using RANSAC. This, however, requires a global
threshold for the consensus, which limits the precision of the estimation.
The experiments were performed on the Aloi database [22]. For each run we se-
lected 20 images and randomly deformed them with an affine transformation with
a scale variation between 0.5 and 2 and a rotation between 0.5 and 2.0 radians. We
extracted the SIFT features from the original and transformed image and picked as
candidate associations all the pairs with sufficiently similar descriptors. Each can-
didate association represents a single transformation and supports only associations
with similar transformations. To measure the support between two associations, we
project the first point of one association with the transformation of the other asso-
ciation. Then we measure the distance between the transformed point and the cor-
responding point in the first association. We repeat the operation reversing the role
of the two associations obtaining the two distances d1 and d2. The support is, then,
e−max(d1,d2). Once the best match is extracted, we have two alternatives to compute
the final transformation: the first is an unweighted approach where we compute a
simple average of the transformation parameters related to the associations in the
match. The second approach weighs the transformation parameters with the propor-
tion of the population playing the related strategy at equilibrium.
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Fig. 8.2 Point pattern matching: the first two columns show the original images, the third and
fourth columns show the extracted features, and the fourth and fifth show the allineation error
using the transforms estimated using RANSAC (fifth) and our approach (sixth)
We compare our approach with RANSAC, where we determine the associations
to agree within tolerance if max(d1, d2) < 5 pixels. the value of 5 pixels was ex-
perimentally determined to be the one which gave the best results. Note that this
threshold on the error limits the accuracy of RANSAC, while our approach, being
parameter-less, does not suffer from this drawback.
Figure 8.2 shows the original images (first two columns), the extracted features
(third and fourth columns), and the transformation error obtained using the two ap-
proaches (last two columns). The error is the difference between the original image
transformed with the estimated transformation and the second image. The fifth col-
umn shows the error obtained using the transformation estimated with RANSAC,
while the sixth column shows the difference using the transformation estimated us-
ing the weighted version of our approach. As can be seen our approach estimates
the transformation with higher accuracy than RANSAC. So much so that the differ-
ence images are almost completely black. This is mainly due to the lack of a lower
bound on the precision of the transformation, which for RANSAC is enforced by
the consensus threshold.
Figure 8.3 plots the error in the estimation of translation, scale and rotation as
we increase the variations in scale and orientation. The average and standard devia-
tions are computed over 140 images. As can be seen, the weighted and unweighted
versions of our approach have similar performance, with the weighted version ex-
hibiting slightly lower error. On the other hand RANSAC show errors an order of
magnitude larger in all conditions.
In an attempt to quantify the sensitivity of the approach to noise, we added an
increasing amount of Gaussian noise to the rotated and scaled images before we
computed the SIFT features. This introduces an increasing number of outliers as
well as missing feature points. Figure 8.4 plots the Frobenius norm of the difference
between the ground truth and the estimated transformation matrices as the standard
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Fig. 8.3 Point pattern matching: error in the estimation of translation, scale and rotation as we
increase the variations in scale and orientation. The plots in the first column show the error in
rotation angle, scale and translation as a function of the rotation angle. The plots in the second
column show the errors as a function of the scale factor
deviation of the Gaussian noise increases. For each noise level we selected 20 im-
ages and randomly deformed them with an affine transformation with a scale varia-
tion between 0.5 and 2 and a rotation between 0.5 and 2.0 radians. From the plot we
can see that our approach maintains a much lower error as compared to RANSAC
even at high noise levels. Further, we can see that, while the rate with which the
error increases with noise is similar for RANSAC and the unweighted version of
our approach, the weighted version appears to provide much lower error even with
a high level of noise.
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Fig. 8.4 Point pattern
matching: sensitivity to noise.
The plot displays the
Frobenius norm of the
difference between exact and
estimated transformation
errors under an increasing
amount of Gaussian noise
8.6 Game-Theoretic Surface Alignment
Surface registration is a fundamental step in the reconstruction of three-dimensional
objects. This is typically a two step process where an initial coarse motion estima-
tion is followed by a refinement.
Coarse registration techniques can be roughly organized into three main classes:
global methods, feature-based methods and technique based on RANSAC [20] or
PROSAC [14] schemes. Global methods, such as PCA [15] or Algebraic Surface
Model [50], exploit some global property of the surface and thus are very sensitive
to occlusion. Feature-based approaches aim at the localization and matching of in-
teresting points on the surfaces. They are more precise and can align surfaces that
exhibit only partial overlap. Nevertheless, the unavoidable localization error of the
feature points prevents them from obtaining accuracies on par with fine registration
methods.
A completely different coarse registration approach is the one taken by
RANSAC-based techniques. DARCES [13] is based on the random extraction of
sets of mates from the surfaces and their validation based on the accuracy of the
estimated transformation. The more recent Four Points Congruent Sets method [2]
follows a similar route, but filters the data to reduce noise and performs early check
in order to reduce the number of trials.
A recent and extensive review of many different methods can be found in [48].
In this section, we present a novel technique that allows obtaining a fine sur-
face registration in a single step, without the need of an initial motion estimation.
The main idea of our approach is to cast the selection of correspondences between
points on the surfaces in a game-theoretic framework. This process yields a very
robust inlier selection scheme that does not depend on any particular technique for
selecting the initial strategies as it relies only on the global geometric compatibility
between correspondences. This context diverges from the general matching scheme
presented in the previous section in that only a few correspondences a sought. In
fact, contrary to the tradition of graph matching, inlier selection processes are tuned
to very low false positive correspondences, admitting in converse a large amount of
false negatives.
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Fig. 8.5 Example of the two basic Surface Hashes proposed
In principle, by adopting our matching approach, all the points from both surfaces
to registered could be used to build the matching strategies; in practice, however,
this would lead to a very big set of candidates with a huge portion of outliers. We
solve the problem by adopting very loose yet repeatable descriptors, and by adopting
a game-theoretic approach to select only the distinctive points. In the remaining of
this section, we will introduce the point selection process, then the matching process
used to perform surface alignment and finally we will experimentally characterize
its performance with respect to the state-of-the-art.
8.6.1 Interest Point Selection
Given the large number of points contained in typical 3D objects, it is not practical
for any matching algorithm to deal with all of them. In addition, the isolation of a
relatively small number of interest points can enhance dramatically the ability of
the matcher to avoid false correspondences. We do this using a novel set of robust
descriptors and a game-theoretic feature-selection approach. The Normal Hash (see
Fig. 8.5(a)) is obtained by setting a reference on the average surface normal over a
patch that extends to the largest scale (red arrow in figure) and then, for each smaller
scale, calculating the dot product between the reference and the average normal over
the reduced patches (blue arrows in figure). The rationale behind this measure lies
in the observation that at the largest scale the average normal is more stable with re-
spect to noise and that the dot product offers a concise representation of the relation
between the vectors obtained at various scales. The Integral Hash (see Fig. 8.5(b)) is
similar in spirit to the Normal Hash. In this case, we search for the best fitting plane
(in the least squares sense) with respect to the surface patch associated to the largest
scale. Then we calculate the volume enclosed between the surface and such a plane.
In practice, it is not necessary to evaluate this volume accurately: even naive approx-
imations, such as the sum of the distances of the surface points from the plane, have
been shown empirically to provide a reasonable approximation. Note that Normal
Hashes evaluated over n scales yield descriptor vectors of length n − 1 (since the
larger scale is used only to calculate the reference normal), while Integral Hashes
provide n-dimensional vectors. In Fig. 8.6, a Normal Hash of dimension 3 (respec-
tively from (a) to (c)) evaluated over 4 scales is shown. Note that the descriptor is
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Fig. 8.6 Example of a 3-dimensional Normal Hash and the related detection process
not defined at the points for which the larger support is not fully contained in the
surface, i.e., points close to the surface boundary.
In order to obtain discriminant descriptors, we screen out features exhibiting de-
scriptors that are too common over the surface. This is in essence an anomaly de-
tection problem and it is done eliminating the common strategy detected through a
clustering game where the strategy set S corresponds to the set of all the surface
points and the payoff matrix is defined by
πij = e−α|di−dj |, (8.14)
where di and dj are the descriptor vectors associated to surface point i and j , and
α is a parameter that controls the level of selectivity. We can initialize the set of
retained features to the whole surface and run a sequence of Matching Games, elim-
inating the extracted clusters, until the desired number of points are left. At this
point, the remaining features are those characterized by less-common descriptors
which are more likely to represent good cues for the matching. It should be noted
that by choosing large values for α the payoff function decreases more rapidly with
the growth of the distance between the Surface Hashes, thus the Matching Game
becomes more selective and fewer points survive. In the end, this results in a blan-
der decimation and thus in a larger ratio of retained interest points. By converse,
a small value for α leads to a more greedy filtering and thus to a more selective
interest point detector. In Fig. 8.6 (from (d) to (f)), we show three steps of the evo-
lutive interest point selection with respect to the 3-dimensional Normal Hash shown
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from (a) to (c). In Fig. 8.6(d), we see that after a single pass of the Matching Game
most of the surface points are still considered interesting, while after respectively
two and three passes only very distinctive points (belonging to areas with less com-
mon curvature profile) are left.
8.6.2 Isometry-Enforcing Game
We will refer to the points belonging to the first surface with the term model points,
while we will use the term data points with respect to the second surface. This
distinction is captious since there is no actual difference in role between the two
surfaces; however, it is consistent with the current registration literature and helps
in defining an order within matches.
Given the set of all model points M and the set of all data points D, we need
to construct a set of matching strategies S ⊂ M × D constructed on the selected
interest points. To this end, we perform a discriminative point selection from the
model surface, and from this we create the set S by selecting the k most similar
points from the whole data model D, where the similarity is gauged through the
Euclidean distance of the descriptors. There is, thus, an asymmetry in the role of
the surfaces, where only the model M is sub-sampled through the discriminative
point selection process, and than it drives the creation of the strategy S. When not
otherwise stated, in our experiments we set k to be equal to 5. Limiting the number
of correspondences per source feature to a constant value, we limit the growth of
the number of strategies to be linear with the number of model points selected.
Since the set of strategies S is built by proposing several attainable matches for
each considered model point, while the correct match is not guaranteed to be within
the best k selected matches, it is obvious that the number of outliers in S will be far
superior to the number of correct correspondences. In order to extract this minority
of correct matches buried into S, our framework must exploit the consistency of any
pair of those strategies with respect to some property.
In order to define a suitable payoff function, we need to assign to each pair of
matching strategies a payoff that is inversely proportional to a measure of viola-
tion of the rigid-transformation constraint. This violation can be expressed in sev-
eral ways, but since all the rigid transformations preserve Euclidean distances, we
choose this property to express the coherence between matching strategies. Clearly,
this isometry constraint is looser than the rigid-transformation constraint as it can-
not prevent specular flips of the surfaces, but the global consistency provided by the
game-theoretic framework ensures that only rigid alignments will prevail.
Definition 8.2 Given a function π : S × S → R+, we call it an isometry-enforcing
payoff function if for any ((a1, a2), (b1, b2)) and ((c1, c2), (d1, d2)) ∈ S ×S we have
that ||a1 − b1| − |a2 − b2|| > ||c1 − d1| − |c2 − d2|| implies π((a1, a2), (b1, b2)) <
π((c1, c2), (d1, d2)).
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An isometry-enforcing payoff function is a function that is monotonically de-
creasing with the absolute difference of the Euclidean distances between respective
model and data points of the matching strategies compared. In other words, given
two matching strategies, their payoff should be high if the distance between the
model points is equal to the distance between the data points, and it should decrease
as the difference between such distances increases.
Given a set of matching strategies S and an enumeration O = {1, . . . , |S|} over
it, an isometry-enforcing game is a clustering game where the population is defined
as a vector x ∈ Δ|S| and the payoff matrix A = (aij ) is defined as aij = π(si, sj ),
where si , sj ∈ S are enumerated by O and π is a symmetric one-to-one isometry-
enforcing payoff function. Intuitively, xi accounts for the percentage of the popula-
tion that plays the ith matching strategy.
In theory, any rigidity-enforcing payoff function can be used to perform surface
registration. Throughout the experimental section, we adopted
π
(
(a1, b1), (a2, b2)
) =
(
min(|a1 − a2|, |b1 − b2|)
max(|a1 − a2|, |b1 − b2|)
)λ
, (8.15)
where a1, a2, b1, and b2 are respectively the two model (source) and data (destina-
tion) points in the compared matching strategies. This is derived from a Lipschitz
distance, providing a relative measure of distortion of the global Euclidean metric.
Parameter λ allows making the enforcement of the conservation of the Euclidean
distance more or less strict.
Since, contrary to the matching setup, in the inlier selection framework we are
only interested in a few good correspondences, even after converging to an ESS,
we select only a small set of the support to estimate the rigid transformation. In
particular, we keep only strategies whose population proportion is more than a given
ration of the maximum surviving population.
8.6.3 Application to Surface Alignment
In order to explore the role of both the discriminant feature detector and the match-
ing technique, we designed a wide range of experimental validations. First, we an-
alyzed the sensitivity of the descriptor to several sources of noise and the influence
of the number of scales (and thus of the size of the descriptor vector). Further, we
studied the sensitivity of the matching algorithm to its parameters, with the goal
of identifying an optimal parameterization (if any) and assess the stability of the
method. Also a number of comparative test were made. Specifically, we analyzed
the performance obtained by using our matcher with different feature detectors and
the overall comparison with respect to other well-know registration pipelines.
All the experiments were performed on a personal computer equipped with an
Intel Core i7 processor and 8 GB of memory. The dataset used, where not differently
stated, was built upon publicly available models; specifically the Bunny [54], the
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Fig. 8.7 Comparison of different descriptors using real and synthetic objects
Armadillo [32], and the Dragon [17] from the Stanford 3D scanning repository. To
further assess the shortcomings of the various approaches, we used two synthetic
surfaces representative of as many difficult classes of objects: a wave surface and
a fractal landscape (see Fig. 8.7). Since a ground truth was needed for an accurate
quantitative comparison, we generated virtual range images from the models and
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then applied additive Gaussian noise to them. The descriptor used was a mixed
Surface Hash with 3 scales.
8.6.3.1 Sensitivity Analysis of the Descriptor
The performance of different descriptors was tested for various levels of noise and
occlusion applied to two surfaces obtained from real range scans (“armadillo” and
“dragon” from Stanford) and two synthetic surfaces designed to be challenging for
coarse and fine registration techniques (“fractal” and “wave”). The noise is a posi-
tional Gaussian perturbation on the point coordinates with its level (σ ) expressed
in terms of the percentage of the average edge length, while occlusion denotes the
percentage of data and model surfaces removed. The RMS Ratio in the charts is the
ratio of the root mean square error (RMS) obtained after registration and the RMS
of ground truth alignment. The Normal and Integral Hashes were calculated over
3 levels of scale and the “Mixed” Hash is simply the juxtaposition of the previous
two.
In Fig. 8.7, we see that all the descriptors obtain good results with real range
images and the registration “breaks” only with very high levels of noise (on the
same order of magnitude of the edge length). Interestingly, the Mixed Hash always
obtains the best performance, even with high level of noise: This higher robustness
is probably due to the orthogonality between the Normal and Integral Hashes. The
behavior with the “fractal” synthetic surface is quite similar, by contrast all the de-
scriptors seem to perform less well with the “wave” surface. This is due to the lack
of distinctive features on the model itself, which indeed represents a challenge for
any feature based registration technique [47]. The performance obtained with re-
spect to occlusion is similar: all the descriptors achieve fairly good results and are
resilient to high levels of occlusion (note that 40 percent occlusion is applied both
to data and model). Overall the Mixed Hash appears to be consistently more ro-
bust. Since we found that the descriptors calculated over 3 levels of scale break at a
certain level of noise, we were interested in evaluating if their performance can be
improved by increasing their dimension.
In Fig. 8.8, we present the results obtained with different levels of scale for the
Mixed Hash. The graphs show the average over all the surfaces and the associated
RMS. It is interesting to observe that by reducing the scale level the technique be-
comes less robust, whereas its performance increases dramatically when the number
of scales increases. With a scale level of 5 our approach can deal even with surfaces
subject to Gaussian positional noise of σ greater than the edge length. Unfortu-
nately, this enhanced reliability comes with a drawback: by using larger levels of
scale the portion of boundary that cannot be characterized grows. In the right half
of Fig. 8.8, the shrinking effect is shown for scale levels from 2 to 5.
8.6.3.2 Sensitivity to the Parameters of the Matcher
The game-theoretic matching technique presented basically depends on four param-
eters:
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Fig. 8.8 Effect of scale on the matching accuracy
Fig. 8.9 Analysis of the sensitivity of the Game-Theoretic Matcher with respect to the parameters
of the algorithm
• The number of points sampled from the model object;
• The number k of neighbors considered when building the initial set of candidates;
• The selectivity λ for the rigidity-enforcing payoff (8.15);
• The quality threshold used to deem a strategy as non-extinct upon convergence.
The first two parameters are related to the building of the set of strategies S. In
Fig. 8.9, it can be seen that optimal results can be achieved with less than 1000
samples and that there is virtually no gain in using more than 6 neighbors.
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The third parameter (λ) is related to the level of strictness with respect to the
enforcement of the rigidity constraint: Higher values for λ will make the payoff
function more steep, thus making the selection process more picky. By contrast,
lowering λ will yield a payoff matrix with smaller variance, up to the limit value
of 0, when the matrix assumes value 1.0 for all the strategies pairs that do not break
the one-to-one constraint and 0 otherwise. As expected, our experiments show that
very low or very high values for λ deliver poor results and, while there is clearly a
larger variance that what has been captured by the experiments, the optimal value
seems to be around 1.
Finally, the fourth parameter sets the ratio (with respect to the most successful
match) used to classify a strategy as surviving or extinct. The last experiment of
Fig. 8.9 shows that all the tested values below 0.8 give similarly good results. This
simply means that there is good separability between extinct and non-extinct strate-
gies, the former being very close to 0.
Overall, we can assess that the matching method has a very limited dependency
on its parameters, which can easily be fixed at values that are both safe and efficient.
The most influent parameter is probably λ; however, a value of 1.0 (that indeed
simplifies equation (8.15) to a simple ratio) appears to be optimal for our test set.
8.6.3.3 Comparison with Full Pipelines
The whole registration algorithm presented can be classified as a coarse method,
since it does not require initialization. For this reason, we compared it with sev-
eral other coarse techniques. Specifically, we implemented the whole Spin Images
pipeline [29] and used the implementation supplied by the authors respectively for
the MeshHOG/MeshDOG [61] and the Four Points Congruent Sets [2] methods.
The latter method was initialized both with the parameters suggested by the authors
and also with values for t and s that we manually optimized to get the best possible
results from our dataset.
In the first row of Fig. 8.10, we present the results of this comparison. In these ex-
periments, the occlusion is measured with respect to each range image and is applied
in opposite directions of the overlapped area. That means that with an occlusion of
10 % the actual overlap is reduced by 20 %. The noise is an additive Gaussian
noise with a standard error expressed as a percentage over the average edge length.
The occlusion test has been made with noise at level 10 % and the noise test was
performed with no occlusion. From the tests our method exhibits better results in
both scenarios and breaks only with high levels of occlusion and noise. Note that
the 4PCS method with parameters t = 0.9 and s = 500 does not always give a fea-
sible solution with any occlusion greater than 10 %. With extreme levels of noise
the 4PCS seems to get better and obtains lower RMS ratios than our method. The
reduction in performance of our method is related to the breaking of the descrip-
tors, that at such high levels of noise do not carry sufficient information any more.
A clarification should finally be made about the apparent improvement that 4PCS
seems to exhibit as noise increases. In fact, at high noise levels the RMS associated
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Fig. 8.10 Comparisons between our Game-Theoretic Registration technique and other widely
used surface registration pipelines
to ground-truth motion is also high. In such conditions the additional error due to
misalignment becomes less relevant in terms of contribution to the overall RMS ra-
tio, which is dominated by random noise. Since 4PCS explores thoroughly the set
of feasible motions until a solution with RMS low enough is found (depending on
the stop criteria), it is expected to test more alignments when surfaces are noisier
and thus yield lower RMS ratio values. However, it is easy to build simple examples
where a solution can obtain a low RMS ratio (even lower than one) and still being
far from the correct alignment. Figure 8.11 shows an example coarse registration
obtained respectively with Spin Images, 4PCS, and the Game-Theoretic registration
technique.
These results only indicate that GTR gives a better coarse registration; how-
ever, to seek a perfectly fair comparison, it is also needed to measure how much
enhancement can be obtained by performing a fine registration step starting from
the obtained coarse initialization. To this end, we applied the ICP algorithm start-
ing from the initial motion estimated with the different methods with no occlusion
and random noise values below 60 %. The results are shown in the bottom row of
Fig. 8.10 with histograms obtained by binning the distance between model points
and data surface along the normal vector. Normals that do not intersect the data
surface are discarded. The size of the bins grows exponentially. The first histogram
shows the distribution obtained from the coarse registration and the second reports
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Fig. 8.11 Examples of surface registration obtained respectively with Spin Images (first row),
MeshDOG (second row), 4PCS (third column) and our Game-Theoretic Registration technique
(last row)
the enhancement obtained by applying ICP. Again, the results are favorable to our
method, with very few points exhibiting large errors after refinement.
8.6.3.4 Quality of Fine Registration
In addition to the full pipeline comparisons, we also investigated how reliable the
proposed approach would be if directly used as a fine registration technique. The
goal of this test is two-fold: we want to evaluate our quality as a complete alignment
tool and, at the same time, find the breaking point of traditional fine registration
techniques.
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Fig. 8.12 Comparison of fine
registration accuracies (the
green dashed line represents
y = x)
The method we used for comparison is a best-of-breed ICP variant, similar to the
one proposed in [54]. Point selection is based on Normal Space Sampling [47], and
point-surface normal shooting is adopted for finding correspondences; distant mates
or candidates with back-facing normals are rejected. To minimize the influence of
incorrect normal estimates, matings established on the boundary of the mesh are also
removed. The resulting pairings are weighted with a coefficient based on compati-
bility of normals, and finally a 5 %-trimming is used. Each test was performed by
applying a random rotation and translation to different range images selected from
the Stanford 3D scanning repository. Additionally, each range image was perturbed
with a constant level of Gaussian noise with standard deviation equal to 12 % of the
average edge length. We completed 100 independent tests and for each of them we
measured the initial RMS error between the ground-truth corresponding points and
the resulting error after performing a full round of ICP (ICP) and a single run of our
registration method (GTR). In addition, we applied a step of ICP to the registration
obtained with our method (GTR + ICP) in order to assess how much the solution
extracted using our approach was further refinable.
A scatter plot of the obtained errors before and after registration is shown in
Fig. 8.12. The final error is on a log-scale, so the dotted curve represent the points
with identical initial and final error. We observe that ICP reaches its breaking point
quite early; in fact, with an initial error above the threshold of about 20 mm it is un-
able to find a correct registration. By contrast, GTR is able to obtain excellent align-
ment regardless of the initial motion perturbation. Finally, applying ICP to GTR
decreases the RMS only by a very small amount.
8.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have introduced a game-theoretic formulation of the clustering
problem which is able to work with non-metric (dis)similarities (even asymmetric
and negative ones). Within our framework, the problem of clustering a set of data
elements is viewed as a non-cooperative clustering game and classical equilibrium
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notions from evolutionary game theory turn out to provide a natural formalization of
the notion of a cluster. Our game-theoretic perspective has the following attractive
features: it makes no assumption on the underlying (individual) data representation,
e.g., spectral clustering, it does not require that the elements to be clustered be repre-
sented as points in vector space; it does not require a priori knowledge on the number
of clusters (since it extracts them sequentially); it leaves clutter elements unassigned
(useful, e.g., in figure/ground separation or one-class clustering problems); it allows
extracting overlapping clusters (see, e.g., [53]); and it can naturally handle high-
order similarities. Besides the game-theoretic connotation, we have provided also a
combinatorial characterization of our notion of a cluster and established conditions
under which relations with optimization theory and graph theory exist. Furthermore,
we have focused our attention on the algorithmic aspects of computing equilibria in
our clustering game. Specifically, we have reviewed a class of dynamics developed
within the evolutionary game theory, the replicator dynamics being one represen-
tative, that can be used to find equilibria in clustering games. In addition, we have
proposed a new class of dynamics for the same purpose that overcomes some limi-
tations of the classical evolutionary dynamics.
Finally, the proposed approach was adapted to address generic matching prob-
lems and inlier selection problems, where a low rate of false positive is required,
even at the expense of a high number of false negatives. The approach applied
to point-pattern matching and 3D reconstruction problems provided performance
clearly at the state-of-the-art.
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